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Women increasingly start and lead growth ventures yet receive a small proportion of external equity
funding. Term sheet negotiation is a pivotal moment for obtaining growth capital. We employ a multimethod, mixed mode research design to explore strategies of women entrepreneurs who have negotiated term sheets and discuss our quantitative ﬁndings. Results indicate that women entrepreneurs in
our sample worked hard to achieve optimal outcomes yet come up short because of exogenous and
endogenous factors linked to second generation gender bias in the negotiation process. Propositions
for future research are generated given the results of this exploratory research.
Keywords: Gender; term sheet negotiation; private equity; external equity; multi-method, mixed mode
research design.

1. Introduction
Women entrepreneurs still obtain only a small amount of total external equity investment
despite being increasingly involved in high growth ventures. There is a great deal of
research on the different stages of the external equity investment process; however, much
less is focused on term sheet negotiation that determines investments in growth ventures.
Negotiated outcomes regarding valuation, anti-dilution protection, board representation
and other issues can have detrimental effects after a deal is completed if care is not taken to
manage the negotiation process and outcomes.
This paper originated after reviewing the literature on gender-related differences in
negotiation styles, originally published by Babcock and Laschever (2003). If the authors
were correct in their proposition that women were less proﬁcient in their negotiation styles,
then female entrepreneurs seeking external equity from venture capitalists (VCs) and/or
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business angels could be signiﬁcantly handicapped in the term sheet negotiation process.
This exploratory research seeks to examine female entrepreneur negotiation strategies
when obtaining external equity. In the next section we review existing research on gender
and term sheet/contract negotiation and present our research questions. The third section
discusses the multivariate analyses and we share the ﬁndings gleaned from statistical
analyses, which suggest term sheet negotiations for external equity are highly idiosyncratic
and no single set of strategies can be prescribed. The research methodology chosen to
examine these questions was a multi-method, mixed mode design that integrates both
quantitative and qualitative data collection and uses social networking sites for data collection. We discuss the implications of these results and generate propositions for future
research.
2. The External Equity Investment Process and Term Sheet Negotiation
An extensive amount of existing research is focused on the external equity investment
process, which includes equity transactions with both VCs and business angels. Some
researchers have investigated the entire investment process (Paul et al., 2007; Riding et al.,
2007; Fried and Hisrich, 1994; Mason and Harrison, 1996; Tyebjee and Bruno, 1984)
while others focus on particular parts or stages of the investment process such as preinvestment procedures (Mitteness et al., 2012; Mason and Harrison, 2002), negotiation
and decision-making (Amatucci and Swartz, 2011; Nelson et al., 2009; Kelly and Hay,
2003; Landström et al., 1998; Harrison et al., 1997) or the post-investment period
(Shepherd and Zacharakis, 2001; Parhankangas and Landström, 2003; Kelly and Hay,
2003). Compared to other stages in the investment process, there appears to be a dearth of
research on contract, or term sheet, negotiation processes. Amatucci et al. (2008) ﬁrst
identiﬁed the topic of combining gender and external equity negotiation processes as a
potential gap in entrepreneurship ﬁnance research.
2.1. Gender and negotiation
The organizational behavior, psychology and conﬂict management ﬁelds provide an
established body of research on gender and negotiation (Bowles, 2013; Stuhlmacher and
Walters, 1999). Research ﬁndings by Babcock and Laschever (2003, 2008) show gender
differences in the negotiating process with women appearing to be more satisﬁed with
less optimal outcomes than men. Much of the early research suggests negotiation is a
man’s game with women encountering a signiﬁcant disadvantage (Bowles and Kray,
2013).
Recently more reﬁned research has examined various social, situational and psychological factors that can inﬂuence the gender and negotiation outcomes. A second generation of researchers (Bowles et al., 2005), proposed a contingency approach that moved
away from strict adherence to preconceived gender-related stereotypes and sought contextual variables that moderated the gender-negotiation relationship. Consistent with this,
Riley and McGinn (2002) point out that “sometimes gender matters, and sometimes it does
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not.” They contend that a higher degree of “structural ambiguity” and the presence of
“gender triggers”a increase the effect of gender on negotiation expectations, behavior and
performance. Similarly, Bowles and Kray (2013) suggest situational factors include (1) the
degree of ambiguity in expected outcomes; (2) the role of female stereotype threat activation where women feel a need to behave in a manner that is consistent with the gender
stereotype; (3) role incongruence where women may fear a social backlash against them
when adopting more aggressive behavior typically associated with men; (4) ascribed
power differentials; and (5) social cues such as face-to-face negotiations versus by computer. Although not focused on gender, Brooks and Schweitzer (2011) identify anxiety as a
moderating variable in the negotiation process. Other factors include whether one is negotiating for self or on behalf of others (Chen and Chen, 2012) and the gender composition
of the dyad (Eriksson and Sandberg, 2012; Bowles and Flynn, 2010).
2.2. Gender, negotiation and external equity
Very little research exists on the role of gender on term sheet negotiations in the external
equity investment process. In considering the impact of gender on ﬁnancing female-owned
ventures, Constantinidis, Cornet and Asadei (2006) call for more programs to develop
knowledge in areas such as accounting, business plan development and human resource
management, as well as behavioral skills, such as assertiveness and negotiating aptitude. In
their study of female entrepreneurs who succeeded in obtaining business angel investment,
Amatucci and Sohl (2004) found several respondents who, in retrospect, wished they
asked for more and admitted that they under-estimated the ﬁnancial needs of their ventures. Additionally they expressed concerns about not understanding some of the “hidden
costs” such as subordinated debentures, anti-dilution or extra legal fees.
Amatucci and Swartz (2011) conducted an exploratory qualitative study of twelve
female entrepreneurs who negotiated for external equity ﬁnancing and found that effective negotiating strategies included: seeking a cooperative win-win situation, extensive
use of metrics, using the same negotiators throughout the negotiation event, conducting
several shorter sessions rather than one long one and knowing when to walk away from
the table. Ineffective negotiation strategies included: being too aggressive or pushy,
having long sessions and poor time management and under-estimating how much capital
to ask for.
Nelson et al. (2009) suggest that women’s experiences in securing venture capital (VC)
can best be understood by employing a sociological perspective that makes sense of
women’s behaviors through the lens of institutional theory and symbolic interactionism.
Therefore, the focus shifts from the gender divide to other social factors to explain the
observed differences in participation rates in VC between male and female entrepreneurs.
They posit that VC interactions inhabit a space highly circumscribed by a particular

a

Riley and McGinn (2002) deﬁne structural ambiguity as “the degree of potential variation in a party’s interpretation of the economic structure of the negotiation.” Examples of gender triggers include “gender-based social
roles” and “gender-based performance stereotypes.”
1650015-3

E. Swartz, F. M. Amatucci & S. Coleman

cultural-cognitive environment. Therefore, the focus should be on the preparedness of the
individual to participate in the VC game and that understanding the rules is as important as
participating in the game. Moreover, respondents reported evidence of a shadow negotiation process that underpins the actual negotiation process (Kolb and Williams, 2000,
2003). This shadow process exhibits manifestations of second generation negotiation
gender bias processes, including a lack of female role models in the VC industry, gendered
career paths and occupations, a lack of network and sponsor access, homophily, and the
double-bind that women face between being respected or being liked at work (Ibarra et al.,
2013). More subtle than outright discrimination, second generation bias is no less real or
debilitating in the effect it can have on performance in the workplace.
In summary, negotiating a term sheet or contract is an important stage of the external
equity investment process; yet, there is a lack of understanding of how gender plays out in this
negotiation domain. An abundance of research examining the role of gender and negotiation
processes emanates from organizational behavior, psychology and conﬂict management.
Given the low representation of female entrepreneurs receiving external equity ﬁnancing and
the paucity of research focused on the term sheet negotiation process, we address a signiﬁcant
gap in the literature by applying the frameworks from these other disciplines to term sheet
negotiations. The speciﬁc research questions we address are as follows:
(1) Are female entrepreneurs’ negotiating styles problematic as they participate in term
sheet/contract negotiation for external equity investment?”
(2) What strategies have been effective in closing the deal for female entrepreneurs?
(3) What are some of the major challenges to closing a successful deal for female
entrepreneurs?

3. Methods
3.1. Sample and procedures
Our sample consists of female entrepreneurs who negotiated for external equity with either
VCs or business angels. All completed an online survey instrument containing quantitative
and qualitative prompts. Survey instrument construction, piloting and data collection took
place between 2010 and 2014. Female entrepreneurs were recruited through conventional
networks and online social media sites used by female entrepreneurs. Respondents were
recruited through other nodes in the conventional networks of the researchers, such as
entrepreneur support organizations, professional associations and alumni groups. Data
were gathered through posting a link to a questionnaire on a web-based online platform,
Qualtrics, which allowed for anonymous completion. The multi-method, mixed mode
research design (Gartner and Birley, 2002; Neergaard and Ulhoi, 2007) allowed us to
organically include women who may or may not be actively involved with groups that
advance the cause of female entrepreneurs; hence, our sample reﬂects the larger population
of individuals who are building companies through raising external equity funding. A total
of 52 responses were gathered and 39 were usable.
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4. Results
4.1. Analyses and variables
Descriptive and multivariate analyses were conducted; this paper focuses on the multivariate analyses used to explore the relationship between negotiation outcomes, entrepreneur/ﬁrm/investor characteristics and strategies, using three separate dependent
variables, all dichotomous. The ﬁrst — “funding” — represented the percentage of
funding sought that was actually raised. The second dependent variable — “equity” —
represented the percentage of equity the entrepreneur had to give up to secure funding. The
third dependent variable was “satisﬁed” and represented those entrepreneurs who described themselves as totally satisﬁed with the terms of their contract. Appendix A provides deﬁnitions for all variables used in this analysis. Given that both dependent and
independent variables were dichotomous, the logistic regression procedure within SAS
was used to conduct our multivariate analysis. The relatively small size of our sample
limited us to four or ﬁve independent variables within each model.
4.2. Multivariate results
As stated above, to explore the relationship between negotiation outcomes, entrepreneur/
ﬁrm/investor characteristics and strategies, we conducted multivariate analyses using three
separate dependent variables. Regarding “funding,” those ﬁrms raising 90 percent or more
of the funding sought were assigned a value of “1.” For the “equity” variable, those
entrepreneurs who relinquished 25 percent or less of equity were assigned a value of “1.”
Finally, for the “satisﬁed” variable, those entrepreneurs who described themselves totally
satisﬁed with the terms of their contract were assigned a value of “1.”
4.2.1. Negotiation outcomes: Funding
Our ﬁrst logistic regression model examined the relationship between the percentage of
funding that was raised and the characteristics of the entrepreneur, her ﬁrm and the
investor. It is written as follows:
MODEL 1: Funding ¼ a þ B1 seeking þ B2 negotiate þ B3 age þ B4 industry þ B5 invmale þ e
Where the variable “seeking” represents the total amount of capital sought. It is possible
that entrepreneurs requesting smaller amounts of capital are more likely to get the full
amount requested. The variable “negotiate” identiﬁes those entrepreneurs who had prior
experience in negotiating term sheets. Given the complexity of the process, this experience
should serve as an advantage. The variable “age” represents the age of the entrepreneur.
Younger entrepreneurs (age 40 or less) may experience greater difﬁculty negotiating with
investors who may have used age as a proxy for experience and maturity. The variable
“industry” separates out those ﬁrms that are in either biotech or internet related ﬁelds.
These industries may be particularly appealing to investors because of their growth and
harvest potential. Finally, the variable “invmale” denotes investors or investor teams that
are male rather than female or mixed gender. Prior research suggests negotiating outcomes
1650015-5
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are affected by the gender mix of the parties participating in the negotiation. Prior research
also suggests a certain degree of “homophily” in the investing process, which can have the
effect of placing female entrepreneurs at a disadvantage. The results of Model 1 are
included in Table 1 and reveal the variables representing age and industry were both
positive and signiﬁcant.
Thus, older entrepreneurs and entrepreneurs launching either biotech or internet-related
ﬁrms have a greater likelihood of raising most or all of the funding requested. As suggested, the entrepreneur’s age may serve as a proxy for experience and maturity. Older
entrepreneurs also have had more years to develop their professional networks, which can
then be tapped for funding. Our results also conﬁrm that industries typically associated
with rapid growth and attractive harvest options have greater appeal to investors and are
therefore more likely to raise the full amount of capital sought. Alternatively, neither the
Table 1. Characteristics of Individuals Engaged in Negotiation Process.
Model Fit Statistics
Criterion

Intercept Only

Intercept and Covariates

AIC
SC
−2 Log L

46.149
47.675
44.149

46.474
55.632
34.474

Testing Global Null Hypothesis: BETA ¼ 0
Test

Chi-Square

DF

Pr > ChiSq

9.6746
8.3849
5.6651

5
5
5

0.0850
0.1363
0.3402

Likelihood Ratio
Score
Wald

Analysis of Maximum Likelihood Estimates
Parameter

DF

Estimate

Standard Error

Wald Chi-Square

Pr > ChiSq

Intercept
Seeking1
Negotiate
Age
Industry
Invmale

1
1
1
1
1
1

2.9320
0.5550
0.9280
3.4699
2.3475
1.1282

1.7216
1.0299
0.9880
1.5265
1.2557
0.9905

2.9006
0.2904
0.8822
5.1670
3.4948
1.2973

0.0885
0.5900
0.3476
0.0230
0.0616
0.2547

Odds Ratio Estimates
Effect
Seeking1
Negotiate
Age
Industry
Invmale

Point Estimate

95% Wald Conﬁdence Limits

1.742
0.395
32.133
10.459
3.090

0.231
0.057
1.613
0.893
0.443

13.114
2.741
640.200
122.566
21.533

Association of Predicted Probabilities and Observed Responses
Percent Concordant
Percent Discordant

75.8
20.5
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amount of capital sought nor the entrepreneur’s prior experience in negotiating term sheets
had a signiﬁcant impact on the percentage of capital actually raised. Similarly, dealing
with a male investor or male investment team did not appear to represent a disadvantage
for female entrepreneurs within this context. We found the results pertaining to prior
experience rather surprising because it would seem that entrepreneurs who have negotiated
for external equity before have an advantage in doing so again. However, our ﬁndings may
suggest that the process of raising external equity is highly idiosyncratic. Thus, past
experience may not be a reliable predictor of future success.
Whereas Model 1 examines the characteristics of the individuals engaged in the negotiation process, Model 2 explores the effect of different strategies and their impact on the
percentage of capital that was raised and is written as follows:
MODEL 2: Funding ¼ a þ B1 advisory þ B2 internet þ B3 talkent þ B4 ventfair þ B5
genmale þ e
As in the Model 1, Model 2 uses the percentage of funding obtained as the dependent
variable. The ﬁrst independent variable “advisory” indicates whether or not the entrepreneur had a formal advisory board. In theory, a board of advisors with the appropriate
skills and expertise should help prepare the entrepreneur for the negotiation event. The
second variable “internet” identiﬁes those entrepreneurs who used the internet as a way to
gather information about the negotiation process. The variable “talkent” represents those
entrepreneurs who prepared for their negotiation by talking to an experienced entrepreneur. We anticipate that this strategy would have a beneﬁcial effect by allowing the
entrepreneur to share in the knowledge and experience of someone else who has gone
through the negotiating process. The variable “ventfair” identiﬁes entrepreneurs who
attended venture fairs and events to learn about the process of negotiating term sheets. The
ﬁnal variable — “genmale” — represents female entrepreneurs who used a male as their
primary negotiating agent. This strategy may be a response to the expectation of
“homophily” referenced above. The results of Model 2 are presented in Table 2 and
suggest two strategies that increased the likelihood of raising at least 90 percent of the
funding requested. These strategies included using the internet to gather information and
using a male as the entrepreneur’s principal negotiator. Although not always accurate, the
internet does include a wealth of both factual and anecdotal information that may help
female entrepreneurs prepare for term sheet negotiations. The signiﬁcance of the variable
representing the use of a male negotiator is similarly important, because it seems to
conﬁrm either the existence or expectation of homophily in the investment process. In
essence, this ﬁnding suggests female entrepreneurs feel that they will not get a fair shake if
they try to negotiate for themselves.
Two additional variables in this analysis, advisory and talkent, were actually signiﬁcant
and negative. Thus, entrepreneurs who use these two strategies were less likely to raise 90
percent or more of the funding requested. These are not results we anticipated. It is
possible that the process of negotiating term sheets is so situation speciﬁc that advice from
others is less beneﬁcial and may actually give the entrepreneur a false sense of security.
Another possible explanation is that advisors and experienced entrepreneurs may
1650015-7
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Table 2. Impact of Negotiation Strategies on Percentage of Capital Raised.
Model Fit Statistics
Criterion

Intercept Only

Intercept and Covariates

AIC
SC
−2 Log L

49.092
50.675
47.092

41.589
51.090
29.589

Testing Global Null Hypothesis: BETA ¼ 0
Test

Chi-Square

DF

Pr > ChiSq

17.5029
14.3734
8.2971

5
5
5

0.0036
0.0134
0.1406

Likelihood Ratio
Score
Wald

Analysis of Maximum Likelihood Estimates
Parameter

DF

Estimate

Standard Error

Wald Chi-Square

Pr > ChiSq

Intercept
Advisory
Internet
Talkent
Ventfair
Genmale

1
1
1
1
1
1

1.1144
2.4143
2.7175
2.9370
0.6433
2.3574

1.0271
1.1432
1.2543
1.3745
1.2520
1.2457

1.1772
4.4600
4.6943
4.5656
0.2640
3.5814

0.2779
0.0347
0.0303
0.0326
0.6074
0.0584

Odds Ratio Estimates
Effect
Advisory
Internet
Talkent
Ventfair
Genmale

Point Estimate

95% Wald Conﬁdence Limits

0.089
15.143
0.053
1.903
10.564

0.010
1.296
0.004
0.164
0.919

0.841
176.939
0.784
22.134
121.383

Association of Predicted Probabilities and Observed Responses
Percent Concordant
Percent Discordant

84.9
12.0

Somers’ D
Gamma

0.729
0.752

encourage female entrepreneurs to raise larger amounts of capital to fund anticipated
growth or guard against unforeseen events. These larger requests could have the effect of
lowering the percentage of funding awarded relative to that requested.
4.2.2. Negotiation outcomes: Retention of equity
Our second set of logistic regression models examined the extent to which the entrepreneur
was able to retain equity in her ﬁrm through the negotiation process. This outcome is
closely linked to the issue of valuation, which our entrepreneurs cited as their most
important concern in the negotiation process in our qualitative results. As in our ﬁrst
funding model, our ﬁrst equity retention model examines the effect of owner, ﬁrm and
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investor characteristics on the entrepreneur’s ability to retain a high percentage of equity in
her ﬁrm. The model is written as follows:
MODEL 3: Equity ¼ a þ B1 seeking þ B2 negotiate þ B3 age þ B4 industry þ B5 invmale þ e
In this instance, the dependent variable “equity” denotes those entrepreneurs who gave up
25 percent of equity or less. The independent variables used in Model 3 are the same
variables used in our initial funding model (Model 1). As in the case of Model 1, we
anticipate that ﬁrms seeking smaller amounts of capital would give up smaller percentages
of equity. Similarly, we anticipated that entrepreneurs with prior negotiating experience
would retain larger equity shares as would older investors. In terms of industry, it is our
expectation that entrepreneurs launching ﬁrms with the potential for rapid growth and
harvest have a stronger bargaining position in terms of their ability to retain equity. Our
ﬁnal independent variable — “invmale” — represents cases in which the entrepreneur was
negotiating with an all-male team of investors. Prior research attests to the lack of women
in senior decision-making roles in angel and VC organizations. In light of that, we anticipate that male investors may have more experience in negotiating complex issues such
as valuation. The results of Model 3 are included in Table 3 and the model reveals that the
only signiﬁcant variable included in the equity model was the variable representing industry. Thus, as predicted, entrepreneurs launching ﬁrms in growth-oriented sectors with
the potential for harvest were able to retain a larger share of equity in their ﬁrms at the
conclusion of the negotiation process. Conversely, the variables representing the amount
of funding sought, prior negotiating experience, the entrepreneur’s age and the investor’s
gender were not signiﬁcant.
Whereas Model 3 examined the impact of entrepreneur, ﬁrm, and investor characteristics on the percentage of equity retained by the entrepreneur, Model 4 examines the effect
of different strategies on her ability to retain equity and is written as:
MODEL 4: Equity ¼ a þ B1 advisory þ B2 internet þ B3 talkent þ B4 genmale þ e
In this instance, the dependent variable “equity” is paired with the same independent
variables used in the second funding model (Model 2). We anticipate the entrepreneurs
with a formal advisory board have access to expertise that would enable them to retain a
larger share of equity. Similarly, using the internet to gather information and talking to an
experienced entrepreneur were both strategies that were signiﬁcant and positive in the
funding model. Thus, we anticipate those strategies would be beneﬁcial in negotiations
pertaining to equity. We deleted the independent variable representing attendance at
venture fairs and events (ventfair) because that did not appear to be an effective strategy in
our Model 2 results. Our ﬁnal variable — “genmale” — identiﬁes those entrepreneurs
who used males as their principal negotiating agents. As in the case of “internet” and
“talkent,” the “genmale” variable was signiﬁcant in our second funding model. The results
of Model 4 are presented in Table 4 and reveal that the only variable that was signiﬁcant in
predicting the entrepreneur’s ability to retain at least 25 percent of the equity in her ﬁrm
was the strategy of using a male as her principal negotiating agent.

1650015-9
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Table 3. Effect of Owner, Firm and Investor Characteristics on Retention of Equity.
Model Fit Statistics
Criterion

Intercept Only

Intercept and Covariates

AIC
SC
−2 Log L

47.234
48.760
45.234

48.695
57.853
36.695

Testing Global Null Hypothesis: BETA ¼ 0
Test

Chi-Square

DF

Pr > ChiSq

8.5388
7.5699
5.8766

5
5
5

0.1289
0.1816
0.3184

Likelihood Ratio
Score
Wald

Analysis of Maximum Likelihood Estimates
Parameter

DF

Estimate

Standard Error

Wald Chi-Square

Pr > ChiSq

Intercept
Seeking1
Negotiate
Age
Industry
Invmale

1
1
1
1
1
1

2.0550
0.5018
1.4982
1.2888
2.6579
0.1155

1.4566
1.1625
1.0293
1.1813
1.1480
0.9107

1.9905
0.1864
2.1187
1.1903
5.3603
0.0161

0.1583
0.6660
0.1455
0.2753
0.0206
0.8991

Odds Ratio Estimates
Effect
Seeking1
Negotiate
Age
Industry
Invmale

Point Estimate

95% Wald Conﬁdence Limits

1.652
0.224
3.628
14.267
0.891

0.169
0.030
0.358
1.504
0.150

16.123
1.681
36.748
135.371
5.309

Association of Predicted Probabilities and Observed Responses
Percent Concordant
Percent Discordant

75.1
18.7

Somers’ D
Gamma

0.564
0.602

As in the case of our Model 2 results, this ﬁnding conﬁrms either the existence or
expectation of gender bias in the negotiating process. Thus, female entrepreneurs deliberately use men as negotiators on their behalf because they are less conﬁdent they will be
able to negotiate favorable outcomes on their own. Alternatively, other strategies, including having a formal advisory board, using the internet to gather information, or talking
to experienced entrepreneurs were not effective when it came to retaining equity. These
results combined with those for Model 1 provide further evidence of the highly idiosyncratic nature of external equity negotiations. Our ﬁndings for Model 4 further suggest that
issues of valuation are highly company and situation speciﬁc. Thus, there is no universally
accepted strategy or set of rules that can be gleaned from advisors, mentors, or even by
one’s own past experience.

1650015-10
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Table 4. Effect of Different Negotiation Strategies on Retention of Equity.
Model Fit Statistics
Criterion

Intercept Only

Intercept and Covariates

AIC
SC
−2 Log L

48.180
49.735
46.180

51.422
59.199
41.422

Testing Global Null Hypothesis: BETA ¼ 0
Test

Chi-Square

DF

Pr > ChiSq

4.7575
4.4759
3.9536

4
4
4

0.3131
0.3454
0.4123

Likelihood Ratio
Score
Wald

Analysis of Maximum Likelihood Estimates
Parameter

DF

Estimate

Standard Error

Wald Chi-Square

Pr > ChiSq

Intercept
Advisory
Internet
Talkent
Genmale

1
1
1
1
1

1.4425
0.3498
0.7214
0.7930
1.4751

0.8721
0.7740
0.7793
0.8484
0.8694

2.7356
0.2043
0.8569
0.8737
2.8788

0.0981
0.6513
0.3546
0.3499
0.0898

Odds Ratio Estimates
Effect
Advisory
Internet
Talkent
Genmale

Point Estimate

95% Wald Conﬁdence Limits

1.419
2.057
0.452
4.372

0.311
0.447
0.086
0.795

6.468
9.476
2.387
24.026

Association of Predicted Probabilities and Observed Responses
Percent Concordant
Percent Discordant

67.8
24.8

Somers’ D
Gamma

0.430
0.464

4.2.3. Negotiation outcomes: Satisfaction
Our ﬁnal model examines factors contributing to the entrepreneur’s overall satisfaction
with the outcomes of her term sheet negotiations. It is written as follows:
MODEL 5: Satisfaction ¼ a þ B1 age þ B2 industry þ B3 invmale þ B4 funding þ B5
equity þ e.
The dependent variable “satisfaction” refers to those entrepreneurs who described themselves as being “completely satisﬁed” with the terms of their term sheet contract. The
independent variable “age” was included in light of the fact that older, more mature
entrepreneurs may have an advantage in negotiating more favorable outcomes, thus
leading to higher levels of satisfaction. Alternatively, they may also have more realistic
expectations than younger entrepreneurs, and may be more easily satisﬁed. The “industry”
variable has been signiﬁcant in our other models for funding and equity retention;
1650015-11
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therefore, it is reasonable to assume that entrepreneurs in “favored” industries such as
biotech and the internet will be more satisﬁed with the results of their negotiations. We
included the variable “invmale” to test the possibility that female entrepreneurs may be
less satisﬁed when dealing with an all-male team of negotiators rather than a female or
mixed gender team. This possibility would be consistent with a belief on the part of female
entrepreneurs that they will be treated less favorably by providers of external equity than
male entrepreneurs.
The ﬁnal two independent variables, “funding” and “equity,” denote those entrepreneurs who (a) raised at least 90 percent of the funding they asked for and (b) retained at
least 25 percent of the equity in their ﬁrms. Our expectation would be that those entrepreneurs who achieved the more favorable outcomes would also have the highest levels of
satisfaction. The results for Model 5 are included in Table 5 and suggest that the primary
Table 5. Factors Determining Overall Satisfaction with Negotiation Outcomes.
Model Fit Statistics
Criterion

Intercept Only

Intercept and Covariates

AIC
SC
−2 Log L

46.252
47.748
44.252

42.982
51.961
30.982

Testing Global Null Hypothesis: BETA ¼ 0
Test

Chi-Square

DF

Pr > ChiSq

13.2700
11.6360
8.4729

5
5
5

0.0210
0.0401
0.1320

Likelihood Ratio
Score
Wald

Analysis of Maximum Likelihood Estimates
Parameter

DF

Estimate

Standard Error

Wald Chi-Square

Pr > ChiSq

Intercept
Age
Industry
Invmale
Funding
Equity

1
1
1
1
1
1

3.6714
0.7661
1.2837
1.4232
0.6694
2.0152

1.6187
1.3202
1.0359
1.0332
1.1253
0.9807

5.1444
0.3367
1.5355
1.8974
0.3539
4.2228

0.0233
0.5617
0.2153
0.1684
0.5519
0.0399

Odds Ratio Estimates
Effect
Age
Industry
Invmale
Funding
Equity

Point Estimate

95% Wald Conﬁdence Limits

2.151
3.610
4.151
1.953
7.502

0.162
0.474
0.548
0.215
1.098

28.609
27.497
31.448
17.725
51.280

Association of Predicted Probabilities and Observed Responses
Percent Concordant
Percent Discordant

83.1
13.8
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factor determining entrepreneur satisfaction was the ability to retain a signiﬁcant percentage of equity in the ﬁrm.
Older entrepreneurs were not signiﬁcantly more likely to be highly satisﬁed, nor were
entrepreneurs in more growth-oriented industry sectors. Similarly, the gender of the
investor’s principal negotiating agent did not have a signiﬁcant effect on satisfaction
suggesting that these female entrepreneurs were not averse to negotiating with men as long
as they secured the outcomes they wanted. We found it somewhat surprising that the
percentage of funding raised was not a signiﬁcant predictor for satisfaction. This could
suggest that women asked for larger amounts of funding than they actually expected to
receive and were thus satisﬁed with less. Alternatively, it may suggest that the ability to
retain ownership and control was such a powerful motivator that it “trumped” other less
pressing outcomes.
5. Discussion
Our ﬁndings suggest a nuanced situation with respect to gender during the negotiation
process for external equity consistent with prior research on the role of context, situational
ambiguity and stereotypes (Bowles and Kray, 2013; Riley and McGinn, 2002). The female
entrepreneurs in our sample demonstrate that it is feasible to raise capital for entrepreneurial ventures and our data shows the issues affecting negotiation terms and valuation of
companies are highly speciﬁc to industry and company situation. Female entrepreneurs in
our research do not approximate the helpless and naïve actors that some research and the
media often portray; rather, they exhibit agency and purpose in their pursuit of capital
while being challenged by second generation gender bias (Ibarra et al., 2013) issues during
the negotiation process. We interpret our ﬁndings in relation to the speciﬁc research
questions we addressed concerning negotiating styles, strategies and challenges to successfully closing deals.
The multivariate results show that a number of variables were signiﬁcant and positively
related to raising funding, retaining equity and being satisﬁed with the outcome of the
negotiation process. The age of the entrepreneur was positive and signiﬁcantly related to
the percentage of capital obtained from investors (Model 1 regression analysis), yet not
signiﬁcant in terms of the retention of equity in Model 3. Similarly, industry as a variable
proved signiﬁcant and positively impacted the percentage of capital raised (Model 1) and
the retention of equity. These results suggest that growth industries such as biotechnology
or pharmaceuticals, or internet-based companies headed by older entrepreneurs with experience would be regarded favorably by investors (Tinkler et al., 2015).
Prop 1: Older female entrepreneurs in science-based industries are advantaged in raising
risk capital for growth companies.
Female entrepreneurs in our sample worked extremely hard to equip themselves adequately for participating in the “game” of raising risk capital. Our results show this
preparation is vital and reinforces recent research (Brush et al., 2012) on the importance of
ensuring all organizational, technological and strategic issues are taken care of BEFORE
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investors are approached. This “readiness” consideration is important and, although our
questionnaire did not speciﬁcally address “readiness” as a discrete concept, many of the
facets discussed by Brush and her co-authors were represented in our instrument. Indeed,
the technical aspects related to ﬁnancing of companies, in particular how to compute and
understand valuation, equity and dilution, emerged as issues of confusion and concern to a
considerable number of our women entrepreneurs. Research by Tinkler et al. (2015)
reinforces the importance of technical knowledge when negotiating with investors. These
authors demonstrate that when women pitch to investors, they are most advantaged when
demonstrating non-prototypical competences such as being highly educated or qualiﬁed in
ﬁelds such as the sciences or technical areas. We posit this would extend to include women
who are highly ﬁnancially educated or who demonstrate experience in entrepreneurial
ﬁnance or negotiation. Conversely, women are negatively impacted when they do not
possess or demonstrate these competences to investors.
Prop 2: Women with training in ﬁnance or quantitative disciplines are advantaged when
negotiating term sheets.
Many of our respondents understood that to raise capital they need to access their social
networks and extend those to include formal networks that would provide access to capital,
including Springboard Enterprises and Astia. One respondent who raised funds for an
internet-based start-up in Berlin commented on the importance of a strong relationship
with potential investors:
“I have a strong network of experienced founders and I knew all the
investors from before. I was lucky to have good investors who were
good matches. I have no idea how people without a network start
companies”.
Tinkler et al. (2015) show that strong social ties with VC investors beneﬁt women
entrepreneurs more than male counterparts because of a reduction in uncertainty about the
competence and capabilities of the entrepreneur. This is in line with research by Heuven
and Groen (2012) in which less experienced entrepreneurs appeared to beneﬁt from strong
tie referrals to access ﬁnancial resource providers. Strong social ties with potential
investors reduce gender bias. Therefore, the entrepreneurs we quote appeared to be, wittingly or unwittingly, actively engaged in uncertainty and gender bias reduction. This is
extremely important given our ﬁndings about homophily and gender bias in the process of
negotiation. Interestingly, the women entrepreneurs in our sample appear to understand
these issues of homophily and, at times, they perhaps choose to exploit these processes, as
one third of the companies in our sample used a male as their principal negotiating agent.
The supply side in entrepreneurial ﬁnance is dominated by males and our sample mirrors
that with 60 percent of investors being male, while only nine percent were female and 31
percent were teams of mixed genders. Our multivariate analyses show that two variables
increased the likelihood of raising 90 percent of capital sought: internet use to research
aspects of the negotiation process and using a male as the primary negotiating agent
(Model 2). The latter variable was also positive for retaining at least 25 percent of equity in
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the ﬁrm (Model 4). The use of a male on the negotiating team would be a highly rational
choice in cases where female entrepreneurs nursed concerns about achieving a positive
outcome to the negotiation. Those who were determined to raise funding understood the
need to be pragmatic and used male negotiators to “bring home the bacon” in line with
research that shows investors still preferred male pitches (Brooks and Schweitzer, 2011).
Prop 3: Strong social ties between investors and the entrepreneur’s negotiating team lead
to successful negotiation outcomes.
Prop 4: A male surrogate as principal agent in the negotiation process leads to higher
funding levels and lower levels of equity ceded by the entrepreneur.
Our ﬁnal regression model (Model 5) tested for the effect of entrepreneur age, industry,
male negotiator, funding raised and equity retained on the dependent variable “satisfaction” with the outcome of term sheet negotiations. The variable “ability to retain a signiﬁcant percentage of equity” in the ﬁrm was positively related to satisfaction and suggests
that women prized the retention of ownership and control over their company. Although it
was surprising that raising capital did not emerge as signiﬁcant, our descriptive results
showed that 83 percent of respondents agreed that their awareness of the need for subsequent rounds of ﬁnancing affected their decisions.
We recommend that research in the area of gender and negotiation in term sheet
negotiation continues along the lines of a “gender-in-context” perspective suggested by
others (Bowles and Flynn, 2010; Halpern and Parks, 1996; Carli, 1990) as a frame for
viewing the impact of gender at the dyadic or group level rather than the individual level.
Gender-related effects have to be examined within the social context of the negotiation
process and not separately. Using this frame, our ﬁndings suggest some evidence of
second generation gender bias (Ibarra et al., 2013) in term sheet negotiations. Second
generation forms of bias are devoid of overt discrimination and yet the tacit processes that
undergird it continue to hamper progress. Our qualitative ﬁndings suggest that female
entrepreneurs reported no experience of overt forms of discrimination. This is clearly at
odds when juxtaposed with our multivariate analyses on gender. Second generation gender
bias scholars such as Ibarra and Kolb have discussed the manifestations of the phenomenon in the workplace in general in the form of a lack of leadership role models, lack of
access to networks and sponsors, gendered career paths, double binds that equate to
women having to conform to stereotypical female behaviors.
Therefore, the challenge is now to deﬁne the characteristics of second generation
gender bias in negotiating term sheets. We believe our research results provide a means of
deconstructing some of the tacit behaviors and processes at play in settings that form part
of the entrepreneurial ﬁnance ecosystem. Our results demonstrate that female entrepreneurs are striving to achieve mastery of negotiation skills and, through this, to achieve a
degree of “ﬁt” with the cultural-cognitive environment (Nelson, Maxﬁeld and Kolb 2009)
inhabited by investors, both angels and VCs. Our data shows a lack of comfort or clarity
about the negotiation process and we consider at what price women were successful in
achieving their funding goals. Although 80 percent of our respondents in the qualitative
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data reported they were fairly treated, in response to another question, 43 percent had
concerns about the terms of their contract and seventeen percent were unsure.
Individuals who felt comfortable in negotiation settings would have clearer perspectives and would have been able to speak more categorically about their experiences. The
minority of respondents who did have concerns, voice a discomfort with the culturalcognitive environment in the phrases they used in the qualitative feedback — “having no
options” — or “feeling squeezed and manipulated.” Furthermore, if we consider that only
61 percent knew their BATNA (Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement), it appears
that a sizeable minority were unschooled in even the language of the game. Therefore, it is
no surprise that our data shows age and industry as positively related to the percentage of
capital obtained and for retention of equity.
In addition to age being a proxy for experience and demonstration of competence
(Tinkler et al., 2015) could it also be a proxy for learning about the cultural-cognitive
environment, particularly behaviors that investors would expect of CEOs in certain sectors
such as biotechnology and internet-based businesses? Both of these industries have certain
rituals that are clearly understood, such as certain conferences that are essential to attend,
speciﬁc deal structures for particular types of investment and crucially, good sources that
provide some of the information required to frame a “good” deal. Our data shows that
“advisory board” and “talking to an entrepreneur” were both negative variables in the
regression analysis and we are trying to interpret this. The qualitative data and our
interviews with respondents indicated that women perceived access to an advisory board
and an experienced entrepreneur as having been very helpful during negotiations. We
posited earlier in the paper that advisory boards and experienced entrepreneurs would lead
women to ask for deal terms that were not acceptable to investors, thus leading to less
funding being raised. Is this a failure? Conversely, is this a better outcome because the
entrepreneurs knew when to walk away from a less than optimal deal? At least one
entrepreneur shared a story of doing exactly this because she felt that the investor was
unreasonable in changing deal terms AFTER agreeing to terms more favorable to the
entrepreneur. She knew her BATNA, chose to leave the deal on the table and subsequently
secured investment through a different, male, angel investor.
6. Conclusions and Implications
Our ﬁndings mirror prior research ﬁndings in the area of female entrepreneurs and negotiation
and we note that the use of male lead negotiators rather than female negotiators appears to be
more effective at securing more funding and ceding less equity. Therefore, our contribution
reinforces what Brooks and Schweitzer (2011) have shown for investors’ preference for pitches
by male entrepreneurs, even when the information they present is identical to pitches by female
entrepreneurs. These authors considered physical attractiveness — a variable that we did not
consider in our research. They found physical attractiveness was not impactful for female
negotiators but was for males. Clearly, although this use of male “surrogates” demonstrates how
little progress has been made in terms of changing of the cultural-cognitive milieu, the behavior
of the female entrepreneurs in our sample is quite a rational response to secure funding while
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protecting equity. Further research might explore this issue from the perspective of the investors,
as suggested by Brooks and Schweitzer (2011).
This paper makes a valuable contribution about the interplay of gender, industry, age
and a desire to control a signiﬁcant percentage of equity in the company. We believe these
ﬁndings can help partially demystify and suggest strategies that female entrepreneurs can
employ as they enter the process of raising capital and negotiating term sheets while noting
there is no “one size ﬁts all.”
Our ﬁndings have limitations and we wish to suggest avenues for additional research.
First, these ﬁndings are limited to our very speciﬁc sample of primarily U.S. based
companies, headed by well-educated, experienced and mature female entrepreneurs. Our
ﬁndings currently suggest these attributes serve women well when negotiating. Of course,
there are many women who do not approximate this picture but we note the importance of
these attributes in industries such as biotechnology and internet-based sectors. A second
limitation is that we were unable to establish a broad set of prescriptions that apply across
the board to all industries. What did emerge as important is that the entire process of
negotiation is just that: a process that should NOT be reduced to an event. Entrepreneurs
must prepare well for the entirety of the process and, in the case of women, there are
speciﬁc behavioral attributes that moderate outcomes.
As stated earlier, despite the growing number of female-owned ventures, women receive a very small proportion of total external equity investment dollars as compared to
men (Brush et al., 2014; Robb and Coleman, 2009). Term sheet or contract negotiation
during the external equity investment process is critical to obtaining badly needed ﬁnancial
resources under reasonable conditions related to relinquishing equity and control. The
contribution and relevance of this research is to narrow down the gender-related differences that may exist for female entrepreneurs as they participate in contract negotiation for
external equity investment. Our review of the literature and the data collected and analyzed
in this research support other contributions to the second generation body of research,
which stresses the role of context when evaluating gender-negotiation processes. The
qualitative data in our research support the proposition that behavior among these female
CEOs spans a gamut of multifaceted responses to the challenge of negotiating access to
external equity. It is important to recognize the real rather than apparent challenges
women encounter during the process of raising external equity capital so that corrective
measures may be developed to level the playing ﬁeld.
Appendix A. Deﬁnitions of Variables
Dependent Variables:
Funding: If the entrepreneur raised 90 percent or more of the funding amount requested,
the variable “funding” was assigned a value of 1. If she raised a lower percentage of the
amount requested, the variable “funding” was assigned a value of 0.
Equity: If the entrepreneur gave up 25 percent of equity or less, the variable “equity” was
assigned a value of 1. If she gave up a higher percentage, the variable “equity” was
assigned a value of 0.
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Satisﬁed: If the entrepreneur was completely satisﬁed with the terms of the contract, the
variable “satisﬁed” was assigned a value of 1. If the entrepreneur was not sure or had some
concerns, the variable “satisﬁed” was assigned a value of 0.
Independent Variables:
Seeking: Assigned a value of 1 if the entrepreneur was seeking $1 million or less.
Negotiate: Assigned a value of 1 if the entrepreneur had prior experience in negotiating a
term sheet.
Invmale: Assigned a value of 1 if the investor’s principal negotiating agent(s) was male.
Genmale: Assigned a value of 1 if the entrepreneur’s principal negotiating agent(s) was
male.
Age: If the entrepreneur is over 40, the variable “age” was assigned a value of 1. If the
entrepreneur is 40 or younger, the variable “age” was assigned a value of 0.
Industry: If the entrepreneur’s ﬁrm was in the biotech or internet-related industries, the
variable “industry” was assigned a value of 1. Other industry sectors were assigned a value
of 0.
Internet: Assigned a value of 1 if the entrepreneur used the internet to obtain information
about term sheet negotiations.
Talkent: Assigned a value of 1 if the entrepreneur spoke with others entrepreneurs who
had negotiated term sheets.
Ventfair: Assigned a value of 1 if the entrepreneur attended venture fairs to learn about the
term sheet negotiation process.
Advisory: Assigned a value of 1 if the entrepreneur established an ofﬁcial advisory board.
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